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Why save more? One good reason is to invest more. Economies that 
save more can take advantage of investment opportunities and thus 
grow faster. Investing to improve access to education and health, 
for example, can boost growth by increasing people’s productivity 
and income. Investing in plants and machinery is critical to maintain, 
expand, and incorporate technological progress in countries’ produc-
tive structures.
Among all investment types, investment in infrastructure is one of 
the most crucial for growth. Infrastructure (transport, telecommunica-
tions, energy, and water and sanitation) complements other forms of 
capital and labor. If properly planned and built, it can eliminate bottle-
necks that reduce growth potential. What differentiates infrastructure 
from other forms of capital is the need for long-term financing to pay 
for it. This financing should be in local currency as much as possible, 
which is precisely the type of financing that national saving provides. 
The challenge going forward for Latin America and the Caribbean is how 
to develop the proper instruments to channel national saving to infra-
structure. This chapter also explores the region’s options to enhance 
infrastructure as an asset class and make it an attractive investment 
opportunity for institutional investors.
Investment and National Saving: Low, Lower, Lowest
Investment has the potential to impact growth positively in both the 
short and long term. In the short to medium term, investment generates 
growth by boosting aggregate demand. In the long term, investment’s 




higher investment triggers technological changes, induces higher pro-
ductive capacity, and fosters resource reallocation toward higher 
productivity sectors (Jiménez and Manuelito, 2013).
If investment is such an important determinant of economic growth, 
then it’s crucial to ask whether Latin America and the Caribbean is 
investing enough. If comparisons with other regions are any indication, 
the answer is no. Latin America and the Caribbean has systematically 
invested less over time than other regions.
When countries are grouped by income level, the evolution of 
investment follows two distinct paths (Figure 4.1). Up to 2000, low-
and-middle and high-income countries invested a similar share of GDP, 
around 23 percent.1

















Latin America and the Caribbean High income Low and middle income
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serebrisky, Margot, and others (2015).
BOX 4.1. DEFINITION OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
The variable used in national accounts to measure investment is Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation (GFCF). GFCF is a component of a country’s gross domes-
tic product (GDP), together with consumption, government spending, and net 
exports. It includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains); plant machin-
ery and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and 
other infrastructure. It also includes schools, offices, hospitals, private residen-
tial dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.a
a The precise definition of Gross Fixed Capital Formation is provided in the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (2015b).
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However, after 2000, low-and-middle-income countries began 
to invest an increasing share of GDP, while gross fixed capital forma-
tion (GFCF) among high-income countries began to decline. Since 
most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are low-and-mid-
dle-income countries, the region should follow the pattern of increasing 
investment. Instead, average GFCF in the region between 2000 and 
2014 was 20 percent—much lower than the 25 percent average for low-
and-middle-income countries in the same period.
Apparently, 25 percent is a sort of magic number when it comes to 
investment. According to the Commission on Growth and Development, 
25 percent is the minimum investment level compatible with long-term 
growth.2 Its 2008 report on growth analyzed 13 economies3 that grew 
an average 7 percent a year or more for at least 25 years between 1950 
and 2005. The diverse sample of countries included economies on four 
continents, big and small countries, some rich in natural resources, and 
others that were not. All 13 success stories experienced investment rates 
above 25 percent of GDP during the periods of high growth—hence the 
conclusion that a 25 percent of GDP investment rate is the minimum 
necessary level compatible with sustained economic growth.
Unfortunately, Latin America is far from the 25 percent benchmark 
recommended by the Commission. With the exception of Haiti, which 
only reached the threshold thanks to extensive external assistance, no 
other country in Latin America and the Caribbean has come close to the 
25 percent benchmark (Figure 4.2). The regional average between 1980 
and 2014 was just 20 percent.
Investment in Latin America is not only low; a breakdown of invest-
ment by region confirms that between 1980 and 2014, Latin America and 
the Caribbean had the lowest GFCF flows of any region (Figure 4.3). The 
comparison with Emerging Asia is the most striking, with an investment 
gap equivalent to 10 percent of Latin America’s annual GDP between 
1980 and 2013. Sub-Saharan Africa invested 1.7 percent of GDP more 
than Latin America and the Caribbean during the period.
While Latin America and the Caribbean has recorded low GFCF in 
recent decades, it has enjoyed a few episodes of high GFCF. A review 
of 770 country-year observations in 25 countries in the region between 
1980 and 2013 identified 70 cases of high investment (defined to be 
higher than the threshold 25 percent of GDP), or 9 percent of the obser-
vations. Thus, Latin American and Caribbean countries can achieve high 
levels of investment, even in a context of low averages. These cases, 
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however, are concentrated in a few countries (most of them in the Baha-
mas, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) scattered across 
different years and likely related to reconstruction after natural disasters. 
The challenge for the region is to extend these successful experiences to 
more countries and sustain high investment rates for consecutive years.
Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean is not only relatively 
lower than in other regions, it is also more volatile. While volatility pat-
terns vary by country, they generally consist of scattered investment 
Figure 4.2  Average Investment, National Saving, and Foreign Saving Rates, 
1980–2014 
–15 –5 5 15 25 35
Percentage of GDP



























Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Economic Outlook database (IMF, 2015).
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peaks followed by years of low investment rates. Using the coefficient 
of variation (the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean of 
series) to measure volatility, China, the advanced economies, and Emerg-
ing Asia (excluding China) have the lowest volatility.4 Interestingly, the 
countries with the most stable series of investment (China and the rest 
of Emerging Asia) also have the highest levels of investment, while Sub-
Saharan Africa—the most volatile region—along with Latin America and 
the Caribbean, are the regions that invest the least.
So who is to blame for this low level of investment in Latin America 
and the Caribbean? Is it the public sector, the private sector, or a more 
systemic problem of the economic environment that leads to low lev-
els of investment by both the public and private sectors? Unfortunately 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, the answer is that both public 
and private investment are low compared to other regions and country 
groupings (Figure 4.4).
While private investment is the main component of total investment 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, as it is in all regions, private invest-
ment in Latin America and the Caribbean is lower than in the rest of the 
world; the only exception is Sub-Saharan Africa. Public investment is also 
low by international standards. Given that the difference has persisted 
over time, Latin America and the Caribbean is opening an investment 
gap with the world. What is worrisome is that this gap has been present 
since the 1980s and there are no signs of it getting any smaller.





















Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Economic Outlook database (IMF, 2015). 
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Financing Investment: No Place Like Home
National and foreign saving are the only options economies have to 
finance investment. A quick glance at the evolution of investment and 
national saving in Latin America and the Caribbean shows that as low as 
investment has been, it has still been higher than national saving since 
1980, with the exception of only one year (Figure 4.5). The experience 
of other regions is very different. Indeed, national saving is higher than 
investment in the economies that invest the most: Emerging Asia.5 In 
contrast, Latin America and the Caribbean has relied on foreign saving 
to finance its investment. On average, the region had to “import” saving 
in amounts equivalent to 3.5 percent of GDP.
Without increasing national saving, Latin American and Caribbean 
countries would need to boost foreign saving from the current 3.5 per-
cent of GDP to 8 percent to catch up with the critical 25 percent of GDP 
investment level needed for growth rates above 5 percent. That’s double 
the current foreign saving rates! Even economies with access to foreign 
financing would find it difficult to finance a gap between the domes-
tic investment and national saving rates much above 5 percent of GDP 
(Corbo, 1998). Data confirm this hypothesis for almost every country in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: with the exception of Nicaragua and 
Guyana, no country in the region was capable of sustaining foreign sav-
ing rates above 8 percent of GDP for prolonged periods of time.6
























Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF (2015).
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A dramatic increase in foreign saving, while possible, might not be 
desirable. Relying on foreign saving to finance domestic investment is 
risky, for various reasons. In the first place, national transaction costs that 
affect expected returns, perceived riskiness of assets in foreign curren-
cies, and information asymmetries induce home bias in investing. Local 
investors tend to invest in local assets (either in national firms or foreign 
firms with local presence) much more than they invest in foreign markets 
(Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013; Ke, Ng, and Wang, 2010). Second, foreign 
capital flows tend to be volatile and prone to sudden stops (Calvo, Izqui-
erdo, and Loo-Kung, 2006), so relying less on foreign saving reduces 
vulnerability to crises provoked by turbulent international financial mar-
kets. Moreover, it is difficult to maintain large current account deficits (of 
the magnitude required to close the investment gap with foreign saving 
alone) for prolonged periods of time without abrupt reversals, or exter-
nal indebtedness problems (Powell, 2013).7
In a fully integrated world economy, the origin of saving is irrelevant, 
as profitable domestic investment opportunities would find financing, 
either locally or from the rest of the world. In this ideal world, national 
saving need not correlate strongly with domestic investment. But can 
the data confirm the decoupling of investment and the source of saving? 
A paper by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) finds otherwise. For a sample 
of 16 member-countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
Figure 4.5  National Saving and Investment in Latin America and the 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Economic Outlook database (IMF, 2015). 
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and Development (OECD) from 1960 to 1974, increases in national saving 
were matched by practically equal increases in domestic investment.8 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) conclude that international capital is not 
perfectly mobile; hence, an economy in need of increasing investment 
must rely on additional domestic capital (saving) to finance it. Research 
on Latin America and the Caribbean confirms the close link between 
investment and national saving. In the period 1980–2012, for every 1 per-
centage point increase in national saving, domestic investment increased 
by almost 0.4 percentage points (Cavallo and Pedemonte, 2015).
While Feldstein and Horioka’s study is centered on flows—domestic 
investment rates and national and foreign saving rates—the same results 
hold when examining stocks—domestic capital stock and the stock of 
national savings. In developing countries, more than 90 percent of the 
stock of capital is self-financed—which means that foreign savings have 
not provided a materially sufficient source for financing domestic capi-
tal. This result was obtained by calculating self-financing ratios (SFR): 
the stock of tangible capital financed by past national saving, relative to 
the actual stock of capital (Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill, 2007). Aizen-
man, Pinto, and Radziwill define the SFR as the ratio of discounted past 
national saving and discounted past domestic investment. Intuitively, 
the self-financing ratios capture the proportion of the current domestic 
capital stock that is financed with past local savings. An SFR of 1 would 
correspond to an economy in which the entire stock of domestic capital 
is self-financed. A self-financing ratio below 1 indicates reliance on for-
eign saving. An SFR above 1 describes an economy that is a net exporter 
of capital, and contributes to finance capital in the rest of the world.
Recent SFR calculations for 1980 to 2011 using data from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database 
show that, as of 2011, while SFR are above 80 percent in all regions of 
the world, in Latin America and the Caribbean, they are 96 percent, a 
value that confirms the results of Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2007). 
As expected, Asian economies have the highest ratios, surpassing 
1 (Figure 4.6). Overall, for advanced economies and all other country 
groupings, the SFR are very close to 1,9 indicating that most domestic 
capital stock is supported by past national saving. Importantly, SFR are 
growing in all regions, and especially in developing regions. Between 
1980 and 2010, Latin American and Caribbean countries increased their 
SFR from 81 percent to 96 percent, Sub-Saharan African countries raised 
theirs from 69 percent to 79 percent, and the region that invests the 
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most, Emerging Asia, also increased its SFR the most: from 71 percent to 
106 percent. These trends confirm that countries rely mostly on national 
saving to finance domestic capital stocks. The message is clear: there’s 
no place like home as a source of saving for investment.
For Policy, Which Comes First: Saving or Investment?
The existence of a high positive correlation between national saving 
rates and domestic investment rates is one of the most robust and 
stable regularities observed in the data across countries and decades 
(Baxter and Crucini,1993). However, correlation does not mean causa-
tion. Does national saving drive investment, or vice versa? Is investment 
in Latin America and the Caribbean low because of the lack of national 
saving, or is national saving low because of low investment rates? There 
are arguments that support both points of view (see Serebrisky, Margot, 
et al., 2015).
Chapter 10 describes how episodes of important increases in total 
factor productivity generate expectations of higher returns on invest-
ment and thus incentivize subsequent increases in savings to take 
advantage of the enhanced return opportunities. This argument suggests 
that in an economy, saving increases endogenously when better invest-
ment opportunities exist. However, even if such a favorable environment 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data for years 1960–2011 from World Development Indicators 
database, based on methodology from Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2007), extended on Cavallo, 
Fernández-Arias, and Marzani (2016).
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sparks a sharp increase in investment demand, for that investment to 
materialize, the domestic saving rate must also rise. In this context, poli-
cies that mobilize saving will help bring about higher investment rates in 
the economy (Corbo, 1998).
The argument in Chapter 10 does not invalidate the exogenous 
components of saving and the evidence that increases in saving tend 
to precede higher levels of investment. Empirical evidence for the world 
and for Latin America and the Caribbean shows that national saving pre-
cedes investment, but investment does not anticipate future saving.10 A 
10 percent increase in past national saving raises current investment by 
1 percent, while an increase in past investment has no significant effect 
on current saving. This is true regardless of indirect channels through 
which investment and saving could affect each other. For example, cur-
rent investment might generate growth, which in turn increases future 
savings. The data show that saving drives investment even considering 
the indirect effect through growth, but the reverse is not true. However, 
there are episodes (particular countries, or certain years) in which cau-
sality runs in both directions. For example, in LAC-7 (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and venezuela), past saving increases 
current investment and past investment drives current saving (Sere-
brisky, Margot, et al., 2015).
Bidirectional effects do not invalidate the main premise: national sav-
ing in Latin America and the Caribbean must increase if the region is to 
foster investment. However, higher saving is only a necessary condition 
to increase investment, not a sufficient one: in some recent examples in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, investment did not catch up with sig-
nificant increments in national saving.11
Moving forward, the most important policy recommendation is that 
policies to promote national saving and policies to promote investment 
should be consistent (Cavallo and Pedemonte, 2015). If pro-savings poli-
cies unintentionally discourage investment, then those policies will likely 
fail. This is not merely an abstract debate; some popular pro-savings 
policies, such as tax breaks to encourage local saving, have backfired. 
For example, in 1989, Mexico lowered the tax rate for distributed divi-
dends to facilitate the flow of profits from companies to shareholders, 
which could then be channeled toward investments in other firms. How-
ever, this reform was implemented at a time when the relative prices 
of consumption goods and real estate were distorted. Thus, sharehold-
ers channeled the additional income to purchase consumer goods and 
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real estate rather than toward financing investments in other firms. 
Corporate saving diminished because the lower retained earnings and 
household saving did not cover the difference. As a result, private saving 
declined from 12 percent of GDP in 1989 to an average of 8 percent for 
the period 1991–93 (see Calderón-Madrid, 1998).
Investment in Infrastructure: First among Equals?
Why is it important to analyze investment in infrastructure in a book 
about saving? Among investment alternatives, infrastructure is unique: 
it has characteristics of a public good, and the role of the public sec-
tor is vital to make it as productive as possible; it requires long-term 
financing; Latin America and the Caribbean invests too little and does 
not always allocate funding to the best infrastructure projects; and the 
region has proven incapable of channeling a significant share of private 
savings to infrastructure. No other component of investment more accu-
rately reflects Latin America and the Caribbean’s dual need to save more 
and to save better. The region must save more to increase investment in 
infrastructure and save better, channeling more savings to an asset class 
that is highly productive.
A Catalyst for Productivity and Growth
Infrastructure encompasses transport, energy, water and sanitation, and 
telecommunication assets. It is a component of the capital stock of a 
country and serves as an enabler to the supply and demand of services 
or, more technically, as an input in the production function. It is virtu-
ally impossible to think of the production process in modern societies 
or the demand for basic services such as education or health without 
the existence of reliable roads, water, and electricity services. Thus, 
infrastructure impacts growth by improving productivity, reducing pro-
duction costs, facilitating human capital accumulation by easing access 
to educational facilities, helping diversify the productive structure, and 
creating employment through demand for the goods and services used 
to provide it.
 Recent empirical research shows a positive correlation between 
growth and infrastructure investment in Latin America. Calderón and 
Servén (2010) find that comparing 1991–95 and 2001–05, the accumula-
tion of infrastructure stock contributed 1.1 annual percentage points to 
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economic growth in this region. Standard & Poor’s (2015) find that three 
years after an increase in infrastructure investment of 1 percent of GDP, 
the GDP of Brazil would jump 2.5 percent, Argentina 1.8 percent and 
Mexico 1.3 percent. 12
How much infrastructure investment does Latin America and the 
Caribbean need? This is probably the most frequently asked question in 
the infrastructure public policy arena in the region. Clearly motivated by 
the plummeting volumes of infrastructure investment since the late 1980s 
(Figure 4.7), this question has inspired several academic and policy pub-
lications to try to quantify the region’s infrastructure gap (Calderón and 
Servén 2003; Kohli and Basil, 2011; Perrotti and Sánchez, 2011).
The most common ways of measuring an infrastructure gap include 
determining the infrastructure a country or region needs to meet a 
target growth rate, to achieve a specific objective such as a coverage 
rate (for example, 100 percent access to water and sanitation), or to 
achieve an infrastructure stock similar to a country or group of countries. 
Regardless of the definition of the gap and the methodologies used, the 
results are the same: Latin America and the Caribbean needs to invest at 
least 5 percent of GDP in infrastructure for a prolonged period of time. 
Assuming the estimates are right, the region requires additional invest-
ment in infrastructure in the range of 2 to 2.5 percent of GDP per year, or 
the equivalent of US$120 billion to US$150 billion (based on the region’s 
GDP in 2013).
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Calderón and Servén (2010), CAF (2013), and ECLAC (2014a).
Note: The figure includes data for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, the countries for which 
data from the 1980s are available.
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Investment in infrastructure in the region averaged 2.4 percent of 
GDP from 1992 to 2013, while investment in other regions and countries 
was significantly higher during the same period: 8.5 percent in China, 5 
percent in Japan and India, and around 4 percent in other industrialized 
countries.13 Moreover, Latin America and the Caribbean’s infrastructure 
investment is 0.8 percent of GDP lower than in the United States and the 
European Union, regions with a much more developed capital stock that 
require relatively more maintenance investment than new infrastructure 
capacity (McKinsey Global Institute, 2013).
Investment in infrastructure is low across Latin America and the 
Caribbean and has taken its toll on the quality of the region’s infra-
structure services. Only one small country (Nicaragua) surpassed the 5 
percent of GDP threshold between 2008 and 2013. None of the largest 
economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Mexico) invested more than 3 per-
cent of GDP—much less than what is needed to close the infrastructure 
gap (Figure 4.8). The World Economic Forum’s survey of infrastructure 
quality perceptions—the most cited and used worldwide— is conclusive: 
Figure 4.8 Investment in Infrastructure by Country 2008–13 (annual average)
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on CAF (2013) and ECLAC (2014a).
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the quality of infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean is lag-
ging behind, particularly when compared with advanced economies 
and Emerging Asia. Even more worrisome is the comparison with Sub-
Saharan Africa, which is reducing its quality gap. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean, quality increased slightly between 2006 and 2014, but 
Sub-Saharan Africa improved much more. If the trend continues, Latin 
America and the Caribbean will be the region with the lowest perception 
of infrastructure quality.14
Public or Private Investment: Both Is Best
Infrastructure requires rigorous planning because it creates both posi-
tive externalities (network effects), as well as negative ones (mainly in 
the environmental and social realms). It also requires proper supervi-
sion to make sure services comply with adequate quality standards. 
These activities must be performed by the public sector. However, 
the public sector need not provide infrastructure services directly. In 
many countries, infrastructure services are provided by private firms 
through a variety of arrangements, such as management contracts or 
concessions, that commonly fall under the umbrella term “public-pri-
vate partnerships” (although the specific arrangements have different 
legal and economic connotations in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries).



















Source: Authors’ calculations, based on World Economic Forum (2006, 2010, 2014). 
Note: The perception index is based on a scale from 1 (worst) to seven (best). 
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Despite falling from its 1980s peak (see Figure 4.7), public invest-
ment in infrastructure is higher than private investment in all countries 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. The decline in public investment 
was the consequence of two factors: less fiscal space following the 
macroeconomic adjustment policies in the 1990s that reduced public 
spending, and a concurrent belief that opening infrastructure services 
to private ownership and operations would compensate for lower pub-
lic investment in infrastructure (Fay and Morrison 2007). Unfortunately, 
the role of private investment in infrastructure has increased, but not 
enough to replace public investment.
From 1990 to 2013, the region accumulated US$680 billion in private 
investment, exceeding Emerging Asia (US$503 billion) and Sub-Saha-
ran Africa (US$130 billion). Even though the level of private investment 
increased from the early 1990s, reaching 1.5 percent of GDP in some 
years, it never achieved expected levels, leaving the region with much 
lower total investment levels as a percent of GDP than in the 1980s.
Undoubtedly, Latin America and the Caribbean needs more invest-
ment in infrastructure and, given the size of the infrastructure gap, both 
public and private investment will have to increase. But is there room to 
increase both public and private investment? The answer is a qualified 
yes, if actions and policies specific to each sector are adopted.
Public investment in infrastructure, expressed as a percentage of 
total public investment, fell during the 1990s and remained at 30 per-
cent until the mid-2000s. Starting in 2005, the composition of public 
investment changed, and the share devoted to infrastructure rose from 
30 percent to 50 percent. Public investment in infrastructure as a share 
of total public expenditure increased as well from 2005 onward, but only 
managed to reach the level of the 1990s (Figure 4.10).15 The challenge for 
Latin America and the Caribbean is to sustain the increase in public infra-
structure investment. Unfortunately, if history is any guide, prospects 
are not favorable to ramp up infrastructure investment permanently.
When fiscal conditions deteriorate, infrastructure investment is 
among the main budgetary items to be axed. In times of crisis or reces-
sion, cuts in public capital expenditures—particularly infrastructure 
investment—are proportionally much higher than cuts in current expen-
ditures or new tax revenue.16 Carranza, Daude, and Melguizo (2014) 
argue that between 1987 and 1992—a period of financial and fiscal crises 
in Latin America and the Caribbean—one-third of the improvement in 
fiscal accounts came at the expense of lower infrastructure investment: 
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public deficits shrank by 6 percent of GDP, and public investment in 
infrastructure diminished, on average, by 2 percent of GDP—equivalent 
to reducing public infrastructure investment by more than 60 percent. 
Evidence for the first half of 2015 for subnational governments in Brazil 
indicates that the slowdown in economic growth forced states to reduce 
their investment in infrastructure by 46 percent.17
What can be done to increase public investment in infrastructure on 
a sustainable basis and thus help close the infrastructure gap? Unavoid-
ably, public saving must increase. But how can it increase? One option 
is to create more fiscal space through additional revenues (such as 
general tax financing) and channel it to infrastructure. Another option 
is to change the composition of public expenditure, reducing current 
expenditures in favor of capital (infrastructure) investment. Other nec-
essary policies include i) increasing user fees in sectors where tariffs 
are lower than cost recovery levels; ii) implementing charges to cap-
ture value that results from new infrastructure; and iii) boosting the 
efficiency of public investment in infrastructure by streamlining the 
project cycle of infrastructure delivery from planning to procurement, 
better supervising works, and raising the quality of regulation of infra-
structure services.
The key policy message is that to increase public investment in infra-
structure, public saving needs to increase. Public saving does not need 
to come via additional taxation or budget cuts. Switching from current 
Figure 4.10 Public Investment in Infrastructure, 1990–2012
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serebrisky, Margot, and others (2015).
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to capital expenditures and improving expenditure efficiency can boost 
public saving and generate additional resources for public investment 
(see Chapter 8).
The Other Half
The public sector cannot do it alone. The way forward for the region 
is to generate the conditions required to substantially increase private 
investment in infrastructure. How much does private investment need to 
increase? The answer depends on the future behavior of public invest-
ment. Assuming, just as an exercise, it reaches an optimistic level of 2 
percent of GDP, private investment would need to triple (from 1 percent 
to 3 percent of GDP) to reach the threshold of 5 percent of GDP required 
to close the infrastructure gap. Just by looking at the evolution of private 
investment in infrastructure compared with total private investment and 
national private saving (Figure 4.11), it is clear that private investment in 
infrastructure has room to grow—at least to match the values observed 
in the late 1990s.
Boosting private investment in infrastructure requires simultane-
ous action on two fronts: strengthening regulatory and institutional 
capacity to generate a well prepared pipeline of projects; and devel-
oping infrastructure as an asset class to channel private savings to 
Figure 4.11 Private Investment in Infrastructure, 1990–2012
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serebrisky, Margot, and others (2015).
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infrastructure. An important body of knowledge addresses the specifics 
of how to design and implement projects with private participation or 
public-private partnerships.18 The available studies concentrate almost 
exclusively at the project level, focusing on the project’s characteristics 
(sector, investment commitments, sponsors, finance structuring) and 
its performance (productivity, quality of services). However, there is a 
notable lack of evidence on what the region must do to promote infra-
structure as an asset class. Surprisingly, there is no regional macro-level 
analysis of the financing sources used to pay for infrastructure. That is, 
regardless of who builds and operates the assets, the question of where 
the financing comes from (whether national or foreign savings) remains 
unanswered.
The following sections analyze the private infrastructure financ-
ing market in Latin America and the Caribbean in depth and lay out an 
agenda to make infrastructure a more appealing asset, particularly to 
institutional investors, which administer an increasing amount of private 
savings.
Understanding the Infrastructure Financing Market
Infrastructure assets are different from all other assets (industrial build-
ings, machinery equipment, schools) that make up the definition of 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation. They involve significant upfront con-
struction costs, imply high initial risks due to unexpected construction 
costs followed by uncertain demand, generate revenues only after the 
largest expenditure (construction costs) has been made, and cannot be 
reconverted to alternative uses. Given these particular characteristics, 
the only feasible way to pay for most infrastructure assets is with long-
term financing.
Foreign saving to finance infrastructure is possible, but not likely 
in the region. Even in recent years, with positive growth prospects and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) reaching 3 percent of GDP, only 10 per-
cent of that amount has gone to infrastructure, and almost all of that 
has been concentrated in Chile and Brazil (Powell, 2013). Given this 
history of FDI flows to infrastructure, foreign saving is clearly not a 
game changer for infrastructure financing in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
But volume isn’t the only problem with FDI. Local currency pro-
vides other clear advantages as a source of long-term financing. In Latin 
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America and the Caribbean, where capital markets are not sufficiently 
developed, hedging opportunities are not usually available; thus exter-
nal financing is difficult to secure for infrastructure projects, whose 
assets have no alternative use. In addition, there is a mismatch between 
the income, in local currency, obtained from infrastructure and the pay-
ment of debt obligations in external currency. This currency mismatch 
has been a source of instability and renegotiation of long-term contracts 
for infrastructure services. Another reason why long-term financing in 
local currency should be available is that international investors usu-
ally require the active participation of local investors as co-financiers 
in infrastructure projects. All evidence suggests that national saving in 
sufficient quantity and good quality (channeled with the appropriate 
instruments to accommodate the specific needs of infrastructure) will 
be necessary to close the prevailing infrastructure gap in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
A rash of policy reports by multilateral development banks, the 
Group of Twenty (G-20), think tanks, and academics, sparked by the 
decline in available financing for infrastructure and budget cuts in sev-
eral countries following the financial crises of 2008−09, came to an 
additional conclusion: greater private sector participation in infrastruc-
ture is the only way to maintain and improve the stock and quality of 
infrastructure services.19 The reports shared another worrisome finding: 
there is an alarming lack of information about who is included in the defi-
nition of private sector, what the role of each private sector actor is, and 
which vehicles they prefer for channeling infrastructure investments. Not 
surprisingly, the lack of information is more acute in developing regions, 
and Latin America and the Caribbean is no exception.
Private infrastructure financing takes one of two forms: investors 
may choose to invest directly in infrastructure projects by committing 
equity or, by lending to specific projects or infrastructure companies 
(through bonds, loans, and funding from foreign governments and inter-
national financial institutions) (Figure 4.12). Investments can be allocated 
through listed vehicles (such as publicly traded stocks of infrastructure 
companies, publicly traded government or corporate bonds, and invest-
ments in listed infrastructure funds) or unlisted vehicles (such as equity 
or debt transactions made through private markets, or investments in 
unlisted infrastructure funds).
The relative importance of each channel in the infrastructure financ-
ing market varies greatly across countries. The preferred investment 
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vehicles are normally determined by the degree of development of 
domestic capital markets, the regulatory and governance frameworks, 
and investors’ capacity and knowledge (Estache, Serebrisky, and Wren-
Lewis, 2015). Different agents or instruments generally fund different 
phases of the project cycle: banks are usually better prepared to assume 
the risks involved in complex infrastructure operations and to address 
information asymmetries, particularly in the early stages of the project 
design, while long-term bond issuances and financing from institutional 
investors are more viable alternatives to extend and consolidate invest-
ment financing later in the project life (Ehlers, 2014; Canuto, 2014). That 
is why equity and bank loans are more common during the construc-
tion phase, when risks are higher, while project bonds are normally used 
during the operational phases, when projects can generate reliable cash 
flows and risks are lower.
How is private infrastructure being financed in Latin America and 
the Caribbean? A natural way to answer this question would be to fill in 
the boxes in Figure 4.12. However, limitations in data translate into only 
partial information. No publicly available source details the composi-
tion of the Latin American and Caribbean infrastructure finance market. 
To fill this gap, Serebrisky, Suárez-Alemán, et al., (2015) examined the 
typology of active investors in the region’s infrastructure financing 
market.20 The study relied on a sample of 377 infrastructure projects 
implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2004 and 
2014, obtained from the Infrastructure Journal database, totaling over 
US$56 billion.21,22























Source: Authors’ calculations, adapted from Inderst (2013) and Inderst and Stewart (2014).
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Debt Stands Out
Latin America and the Caribbean’s infrastructure has traditionally been 
financed with lending, as shown in Figure 4.13. Although equity gained 
ground at the end of the last decade due to the financial crises, debt 
rapidly recovered thereafter. On average, debt accounted for 67 percent 
of the private financing for infrastructure between 2004 and 2014. Debt 
“over the counter”23 (which includes bank loans to infrastructure proj-
ects) accounts for almost all debt financing and highlights the lack of 
depth of capital markets in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Unfortunately, available data are insufficient to disentangle the com-
ponents of equity financing. The scarce data available suggest that the 
most common form of equity investment in infrastructure is through 
unlisted options and mainly by making direct equity contributions 
to projects. Thus, most of the equity investment in the region is done 
directly, instead of relying on the stock market or on funds operated by 
third parties (listed or unlisted).
The composition of financing vehicles and its evolution over time 
are very similar in Latin America and the Caribbean and worldwide (fig-
ures 4.14 and 4.15). Latin America and the Caribbean recovered before, 
and more quickly, from the financial crises, although the recovery has 











































Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serebrisky, Suárez-Alemán, and others (2015), based on Infra-
structure Journal database. 
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been weak; it was not until 2014 that total private financing in Latin 
America and the Caribbean surpassed its 2007 levels. The shares of 
debt and equity are similar in Latin America and the Caribbean and 
worldwide. The remarkable, although expected, fact is that bank loans 
Figure 4.14 Private Infrastructure Financing by Type of Instrument, 2004–14


































Equity IFIs/government Bonds Number of deals (right-hand y-axis)Loans
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serebrisky, Suárez-Alemán, and others (2015), based on Infra-
structure Journal database. 
Note: IFIs = international finance institutions.
Figure 4.15  Worldwide Private Infrastructure Financing by Type of Instrument, 
2004–14


































Equity IFIs/government Bonds Number of deals (right-hand y-axis)Loans
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serebrisky, Suárez-Alemán, and others (2015), based on Infra-
structure Journal database. 
Note: IFIs = international financial institutions.
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have contracted sharply, a direct consequence of more stringent 
reserve requirements.
Who supplies the financing in this debt-heavy market? Several capital 
providers participate in the private infrastructure finance market (Table 
4.1). Commercial banks hold the largest share of private infrastructure 
financing in Latin America and the Caribbean, by far: one out of two infra-
structure projects were financed by commercial banks during the period 
studied.24 Table 4.1 confirms several interesting facts about private infra-
structure financing in the region. First, national development banks play 
an important role, with a 13.65 percent share.25 Second, multilateral devel-
opment banks’ share is low, consistent with previous estimates both for 
sovereign and nonsovereign lending (Powell, 2013). The participation of 
institutional investors (such as pension funds, insurance companies, and 
investment funds) is negligible (less than 2 percent) in the private financ-
ing of infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Infrastructure as an Asset Class
In the language of this book, developing infrastructure as an asset class 
would be a tool to save better, as it provides a mechanism to match 
private saving with assets that enhance productivity. Infrastructure 
Table 4.1 Private Financing Suppliers in Infrastructure Projects, 2005–14
Ranking Type of agent Share (percent)
1 Commercial bank 50.55
2 National or state bank 13.65
3 Developer/eng. procurement or const. firm 9.12
4 Private company 8.83
5 Multilateral (or) development bank 7.34
6 Investment bank 3.28
7 Export credit agency 2.05
8 Investment or infrastructure fund 1.90
9 Government agency/public authority 1.88
10 Pension fund 1.11
11 Sovereign fund 0.24
12 Insurance company 0.04
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Serebrisky, Suárez-Alemán, and others (2015), based on 
Infrastructure Journal database.
Note: the classification shown is the one used by the Infrastructure Journal database. Eng. Procure-
ment or const. = engineering procurement or construction firm. 
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may be thought of as an asset class in its own right, rather than a sub-
class derived from real estate. Though it resembles real estate, it differs 
in some fundamental ways. In all cases, infrastructure involves assets 
with a long lifespan that create recurring, stable returns and are usu-
ally indexed by inflation. Compared to real estate, infrastructure is less 
exposed to economic cycles, has more predictable cash flows (enabling 
higher leverage), and has legal and sometimes economic barriers to 
entry (giving stability to returns if economic regulation is adequate). 
However, as of 2014, not even the most sophisticated investors consid-
ered infrastructure an asset class. A recent survey concluded that more 
than 40 percent of investors still do not categorize infrastructure as an 
asset in their portfolios (J.P.Mprgan Asset Management and Af2i, 2014).
Despite unmet and fast-growing demand for infrastructure services, 
the high transaction costs, political and governance risks, and policy 
and regulatory barriers found in most countries in the region make risk-
adjusted investment returns too low to attract private investment. The 
pipeline of well-prepared projects is small; appropriate financial instru-
ments of sufficient liquidity (such as project bonds) to mobilize local 
investors are lacking; daunting inconsistencies persist in contracts, con-
cessions, bidding documents, and critical underlying cost recovery; and 
cash flow challenges plague sectors that need private investment. Thus, 
it is imperative to strengthen institutional capacity in the public sector 
along the entire infrastructure project cycle. Better technical capacity in 
the public sector, coupled with less political interference that alters the 
economic condition of providing infrastructure services (through arbitrary 
changes in tariffs and investment programs), would reduce uncertainty 
and, therefore, the cost of capital faced by private investors. According 
to a recent study, 87 percent of investors in Latin America and the Carib-
bean consider institutional weaknesses a major drawback to increase 
infrastructure investment, compared with 41 percent in Europe and the 
Middle East, and just 31 percent in Asia and the Pacific (BlackRock, 2015).
Institutional Investors: An Untapped Source of Financing
Institutional investors, particularly pension funds, insurance companies, 
and mutual funds, are becoming more important players in financial 
markets. In the member-countries of the OECD alone, these institutional 
investors held over US$70 trillion in 2012. Most of the attention to attract 
long-term financing to infrastructure focuses on insurance companies 
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and pension funds. In OECD countries, these long-term investors held 
US$45 trillion in assets in 2012 (US$24 trillion by insurance companies 
and US$21 trillion by pension funds). In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the amount was just over US$ 1 trillion, or approximately 20 percent of 
GDP (Della Croce and Yermo, 2013).
Pension funds and their portfolio allocation in infrastructure have 
attracted much more policy and data-based analysis than insurance 
companies. Despite the increasing attention, information on the alloca-
tion of pension funds to infrastructure is very difficult to obtain, in part 
because infrastructure is usually not considered an asset class of its own. 
The OECD is leading an effort to fill the data gap. The first attempt to 
compare pension fund allocation in infrastructure was by a survey car-
ried out in 2014. Pension funds in Australia and Canada have been the 
leaders in direct investment in infrastructure, allocating 5 percent of 
total assets to this sector.26
While pension funds in Latin America administer an increasing pool 
of funds, allocations to infrastructure are low. The countries with the 
largest portfolios of pension funds under management in the region—
measured as a percentage of GDP—are Chile (63 percent), Mexico (48 
percent), Peru (18 percent), Colombia (16 percent), and Brazil (11 per-
cent). Although the numbers vary according to different sources, the 
share these funds allocate to infrastructure is relatively minor. Funds in 
Brazil invest 2 percent in infrastructure; funds in Mexico invest 1 per-
cent; while funds in Chile invest only 0.2 percent (Della Croce and Gatti, 
2014). The average allocation to infrastructure of the five countries is 2.6 
percent, according to Alonso, Arellano, and Tuesta (2015). Serebrisky, 
Suárez-Alemán, et al., (2015) calculates a regional average allocation of 
1.1 percent between 2005 and 2014.
The current allocation of pension funds in Latin America and the 
Caribbean—in the range of 1 to 2 percent of total assets under man-
agement—is clearly not enough to boost infrastructure investment. But 
how much exposure to infrastructure would be reasonable for pension 
funds in Latin America and the Caribbean? Two alternative scenarios are 
assessed. At the low end is a hypothesis of 3 percent of funds’ invest-
ment portfolios, which represents the minimum level to contribute in a 
meaningful way to increase investments in infrastructure. The high-end 
scenario posits a 7 percent allocation of funds’ investment portfolios, 
which corresponds to the highest exposure to infrastructure by pension 
funds in the world (observed in Australia and Canada).
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A first stab at estimating the impact on infrastructure investment 
focuses on stocks of assets under management and calculates the addi-
tional total investment in infrastructure that would result from allocating 
a percentage of the accumulated stock of pension fund assets under 
management. Suppose pension funds increase their stock exposure to 
infrastructure by investing 3 percent (or 7 percent) of their assets under 
management in infrastructure projects. Infrastructure investment would 
rise significantly in Chile and Mexico. It would also rise—but not enough 
to have a notable impact—in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (see Figure 4.16) 
because of the smaller size of accumulated assets under management in 
those economies. In Chile, infrastructure investment could rise between 
2 percent and 4 percent of GDP (depending on the hypothesis used); 
this could double the current investment rate. In Mexico, a change of 
portfolio allocation by pension funds could more than double the cur-
rent infrastructure investment rate, from less than 2 percent of GDP to 
nearly 5 percent of GDP.27
The preceding exercise uses the stock of assets under management 
to increase investment in infrastructure. This can be done only once. It is a 
one-shot deal. Once pension funds reach the hypothesized 3 percent (or 7 
percent) exposure to infrastructure, no more funds are available to finance 
Figure 4.16  Impact on Infrastructure Investment of a One-Shot Increase in 
Pension Fund Assets under Management
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Total (public + private) investment in infrastructure (average, 2008–13)
Pension funds invest 3 percent of portfolio in infrastructure














Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF statistics and the following country sources: Superin-
tendência Nacional de Previdência Complementar (Brazil); Superintendencia de Pensiones (Chile); 
Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (Colombia); Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro 
para el Retiro (Mexico) and Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP (Peru).
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additional investments in infrastructure. In order to increase the infrastruc-
ture investment rates over time —not just once, but for many years—it is 
necessary to increase investments using flows, rather than stocks.
What does this mean for pension funds? Pension funds could invest 
in infrastructure using the additional funds they receive from (net) new 
contributors to the system and their capital gains. These figures can 
be obtained by computing the variation in assets under management 
from one year to the next. Flows, however, are not as big as stocks. Pen-
sion fund assets under management tend to grow from year to year 
(except during years of financial turmoil, like 2008). Between 2007 and 
2014, assets under management grew on average around 5 percent of 
GDP annually in Chile and Mexico, 2 percent in Colombia and Peru, and 
less than 1 percent in Brazil. Investing 7 percent of these increments in 
infrastructure generates an annual increase in total investments in infra-
structure of 0.35 percent of GDP in Chile and 0.4 percent of GDP in 
Mexico, the countries where investment would grow the most. In all other 
countries, pension fund contributions to (annual) increases in total infra-
structure investment would not reach 0.2 percent of GDP (see Figure 
4.17 and Table 4.2).
Figure 4.17  Impact on Infrastructure Investment of Flow Increases in Pension 
Fund Assets under Management (AUM)
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Total (public + private) investment in infrastructure (average, 2008–13)
Flow increase if pension funds invest 3 percent of the additional AUM














Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF statistics and the following country sources: Superin-
tendência Nacional de Previdência Complementar (Brazil); Superintendencia de Pensiones (Chile); 
Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (Colombia); Comision Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para 
el Retiro (Mexico); Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP (Peru).
Note: AUM = assets under management.
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While the additional investment in infrastructure from savings 
administered by pension funds is sizable in some countries, it’s hardly 
a game changer. Investing 7 percent of the additional assets under 
management can increase investment in infrastructure by no more 
than 0.4 percent of GDP in the most optimistic scenario. Table 4.2 
shows that infrastructure investment rates increase less than 0.2 per-
cent of GDP in most cases. From this point of view, pension funds 
may not be the panacea to increase infrastructure investments. The 
additional investments generated from pension funds would do lit-
tle to close the prevailing infrastructure gap in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
Pension funds may not close the infrastructure gap, but they can still 
help increase investments in infrastructure. To do so, however, requires 
an important set of actions beyond the purview of pension funds or their 
regulators. To begin with, the political risks associated with unstable 
macroeconomic and regulatory environments must be reduced. Other 
actions involve reforming regulations that restrict the share of assets 
under management that pension funds can invest in infrastructure. 
Removing other barriers will require close collaboration between finan-
cial regulators and pension funds in the following areas:
• Asset valuation: Some countries require pension funds to report 
daily variations in their account balances. Direct investment in 
infrastructure involves instruments that are not liquid and thus 
require an ad hoc valuation formula to comply with valuation of 
the portfolio on a daily basis.
Table 4.2  Potential Additional Investments in Infrastructure Using Flows of 
Pension Fund Assets under Management (percentage of GDP)
Country
Total (public + private) 
investment (average, 
2008–2013)
Additional investment if pension funds invest:
3 percent of increase 
in AUM
7 percent of increase 
in AUM
Brazil 3.01 0.02 0.06
Chile 3.14 0.15 0.35
Colombia 4.45 0.07 0.16
Mexico 1.68 0.18 0.41
Peru 4.70 0.05 0.11
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: AUM = assets under management.
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• Transparency and risks: Because infrastructure assets are seldom 
transacted in markets, it is difficult for supervisors (superinten-
dents of pension funds) to monitor accurate valuations of the 
infrastructure asset. Given limited information and resources, it 
is also difficult for supervisors to assess the performance risks of 
infrastructure assets.
• Liquidity: Even understanding that infrastructure assets are held 
over long periods, a superintendent needs to guarantee liquid-
ity of the whole portfolio (this is particularly relevant in countries 
where constraints for members to change pension funds are 
low). Thus, there are no incentives to foster the growth of assets, 
like infrastructure, that are illiquid.
Despite the need to attract private financing to improve Latin 
America and the Caribbean’s infrastructure, the fundamentals of an 
infrastructure project should not be changed to guarantee investors a 
rate of return higher than comparable projects. In other words, favor-
able conditions to attract institutional investors should be created 
and maintained, but they should not come as excessive costs through 
higher average prices, or larger subsidies for both operational and capi-
tal expenditures.
Pension funds offer the potential to raise private financing in infra-
structure. However, they are just one of the building blocks to help 
finance the construction of the infrastructure needed to support a pro-
ductive economy. While not negligible, the potential of pension funds is, 
in fact, limited and highlights the need to tap all available private saving 
sources (including insurance and other institutional investors) and chan-
nel them to infrastructure investment.
Building a Better Investment Strategy
Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean should increase to levels 
compatible with high, sustainable, long-run GDP growth rates. Ideally, 
investment should be close to 25 percent of GDP. Latin America and the 
Caribbean is far from that level, languishing below 20 percent on aver-
age in the last 30 years.
If the region hopes to significantly increase investment, it will have 
to be financed through national saving. Foreign saving is no match for 
national saving when it comes to financing domestic investment. Of 
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course, greater national saving is a necessary condition to increase 
investment, but it is not sufficient. In order for the additional saving to 
have the maximum impact, it must be channeled to the most productive 
investment alternatives in an efficient manner.
Enter infrastructure. One of the most productive uses for national 
saving is infrastructure. Efficient, quality investment in infrastructure 
reduces bottlenecks, which enhances growth prospects. Unfortunately, 
Latin American and Caribbean countries are not investing enough in 
infrastructure; in fact, investment as a percent of GDP is lower today 
than 30 years ago. The infrastructure gap in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is widening with respect to other developing regions and 
advanced economies. Local long-term financing—precisely the type 
provided by national saving—is required to expand the region’s infra-
structure. Foreign saving is at most a complement to national saving to 
finance infrastructure.
Lifting infrastructure investment in Latin America and the Carib-
bean demands an increase in both public and private investment. The 
public sector will continue to play a very important role because many 
infrastructure projects have characteristics of public goods. At the same 
time, the private sector can raise its profile by increasing the efficiency 
of infrastructure service operations and helping finance infrastructure 
projects during tight fiscal times, thereby easing the burden on the 
public sector.
Of course, the private sector is not a monolith. It consists of differ-
ent agents with different expertise and different attitudes toward risk 
and uncertainty, who use different vehicles at different stages to invest 
in infrastructure. The key is to develop infrastructure as an asset class, 
allowing the expansion of existing vehicles, or the creation of new ones, 
to attract the most suitable agents at each stage of the project’s life 
cycle. A step in this direction is to attract institutional investors like pen-
sion funds and insurance companies that have available resources, and 
match them to projects that meet their need for long-term returns and 
low volatility for their investments. This would open up the possibility of 
increasing the current share of private investment in infrastructure while 
helping channel future growth of national saving to infrastructure.
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Notes
1 Countries are classified using the country income classification of the 
World Bank database. Low-income economies are defined as those 
with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita—calculated using 
the World Bank Atlas method—of US$1,045 or less in 2013. Middle-
income economies have a GNI per capita of more than US$1,045 but 
less than US$12,746. High-income economies have a GNI per capita of 
US$12,746 or more. Lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income 
economies are separated at a GNI per capita of US$4,125.
2 The Commission on Growth and Development is a group sponsored 
by four government organizations from Australia, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, plus the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation and the World Bank Group. It consists of 19 policy, gov-
ernment, and business leaders, mostly from the developing world, 
and two Nobel Laureate economists.
3 The countries are Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Rep. of Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand.
4 The ranking of regions, from the least to the most volatile according 
to the coefficient of variation, is China (0.18), Advanced Economies 
(0.21); Emerging Asia (except China) (0.23); Latin America and the 
Caribbean (0.26); and Sub-Saharan Africa (0.45).
5 Emerging Asia includes China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Republic 
of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
6 Nicaragua’s foreign saving rate is 15 percent of GDP and Guyana’s rate 
is 10 percent. Other countries have rates close to 8 percent—including 
the Bahamas (7.2 percent), Belize (6.2 percent), and Jamaica (7.4 per-
cent)—but most of these countries have high rates of remittances. The 
largest economies of the region had foreign saving rates lower than 3 
percent of GDP between 1980 and 2014.
7 For a detailed explanation of macroeconomic vulnerabilities caused 
by excessive reliance on foreign saving, see chapter 5.
8 Feldstein and Horioka (1980) estimate an econometric model of 
investment using national saving as a regressor. They find that for 
every increase of 1 percent of GDP in national saving, domestic invest-
ment increases 0.94 percent.
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9 The only possible exception is Sub-Saharan Africa, but even in this 
region the SFR indicates that most of the domestic stock of capital 
has been financed with national savings.
10 Attanasio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000) use data for 123 countries from 
around the world from 1961 to 1994. Serebrisky, Margot, et al., (2015) 
is based on Attanasio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000), but uses expanded 
data from 1980 to 2013. The update of Attanasio and his co-authors 
gains relevance because the time period is associated with increasing 
financial integration.
11 Bolivia is an interesting case in which investment is lagging behind 
saving, creating a sizable gap (Jemio and Nina, 2016).
12 The theoretical work on the contribution of infrastructure to produc-
tivity and growth began in the 1970s with Arrow and Kurz (1970), 
which was the first study to include public capital as an input in the 
economy’s aggregate production function. The empirical research 
started later with Aschauer (1989), and several papers followed. A 
comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
the impact of infrastructure on productivity and growth can be found 
in Infrastructure Canada (2007).
13 This group includes Australia, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Lichtenstein, 
New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, and 
Taiwan.
14 Efficiency gains in the provision of infrastructure services have been 
documented for Latin America and the Caribbean in the last two 
decades; for details, see Serebrisky (2014). However, these gains 
have not been able to compensate for the low levels of investment, 
resulting in the relative deterioration of perception of quality of Latin 
America and the Caribbean compared to other regions.
15 Data are for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru 
because complete time series for other Latin American and Carib-
bean countries are available only from the mid-2000s.
16 See, for example, Calderón and Servén (2004) from the World Bank; 
de Mello and Mulder (2006); Lora (2007); CAF (2009); Carranza, 
Daude, and Melguizo (2014).
17 See http://app.folha.uol.com.br/#noticia/563261.
18 See EIU (2014) for a recent study specific to Latin America and the 
Caribbean that surveyed the enabling environment for public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure.
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19 See, for example, World Bank (2011); Inderst (2013); Della Croce and 
Yermo (2013).
20 The sample covers the traditional economic infrastructure sec-
tors: water and sanitation (6.45 percent of total projects): potable 
water, sanitation services, and flood defenses; power (50.9 percent): 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity (including 
renewables); transmission and distribution of natural gas; telecommu-
nications (4.7 percent): fixed and mobile telecommunications, satellite 
and internet connectivity, and multimedia services; transportation 
(37.9 percent): roads, urban mass transit, rail, ports, airports, and river 
transport. Social infrastructure or the production of tradable goods 
like oil and petrochemicals are not covered.
21 The sample is geographically distributed as follows: Brazil (28 percent 
of projects); Mexico (26.66 percent); Chile (12.92 percent); Peru (7.88 
percent); Panama (5.32 percent); Uruguay (3.82 percent); Honduras 
(2.82 percent); Colombia (2.14 percent); Jamaica (1.86 percent); Costa 
Rica (1.5 percent); Nicaragua (1.34 percent); Argentina (1.34 percent); 
and others (4.4 percent, consisting of Bahamas, Dominican Republic, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala).
22 The World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure database (PPI) 
also gathers information for infrastructure projects. It represents the 
most exhaustive database worldwide in terms of number of projects 
and investment; it provides information on more than 6,000 infra-
structure projects dating from 1984 to 2013. PPI, however, does not 
break down projects by financing sources. The Infrastructure Jour-
nal database is the most comprehensive source that provides this 
breakdown.
23 The term “over the counter” refers to off-exchange transactions that 
take place directly between two parties without the supervision of an 
exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange.
24 The top commercial banks funding infrastructure in the region are 
Santander (5.61 percent of total projects amount), Citigroup (3.25 
percent), HSBC (3.2 percent),and BBvA (3.14 percent).
25 This share is biased by Brazil, where BNDES, the largest national 
development bank, accounts for 35 percent of private infrastructure 
financing in that country.
26 From an investor perspective, pension funds with a separate alloca-
tion to infrastructure gain direct exposure to the characteristics of 
108 SAvING FOR DEvELOPMENT
the infrastructure asset (including their long-term, stable, and infla-
tion-linked nature). Direct exposure is gained mainly through unlisted 
equity instruments (direct investment in projects and infrastructure 
funds) and project bonds, while indirect exposure is normally associ-
ated with listed equity and corporate debt.
27 The result is obtained by adding the current infrastructure investment 
rate of 1.8 percent of GDP and the additional 1.5 percent to 3 percent 
of GDP that would come from new investments in infrastructure by 
pension funds.
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